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Acquisitions of industrial loan corporations by commercial firms have renewed the debate 
over the separation between banking and commerce in the U.S. On May 16–18, 2007, 
policymakers and academics weighed in on this debate during the Chicago Fed’s 43rd annual 
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, titled The Mixing of Banking and Commerce.
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Recent efforts by Wal-Mart, Home Depot, 
and other commercial ﬁ  rms to acquire 
industrial loan corporations (ILCs), 
which are insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), have 
focused attention on ILCs in particular 
and the mixing of banking and commerce 
in general. Various interest groups, in-
cluding community activists, labor unions, 
and business groups, and some mem-
bers of Congress opposed those ILC 
applications. In response, in July 2006 
the FDIC announced a six-month mor-
atorium on all ILC applications. It ex-
tended the moratorium an additional 
year for nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms in January 
2007 and encouraged Congress to ad-
dress the issue through legislation. 
The separation of commerce and bank-
ing was codiﬁ  ed in the United States with 
the passage of the Glass–Steagall Act of 
1933 and the Bank Holding Company Act 
of 1956. The ILCs represent an exception 
to this prohibition: Federal legislation 
explicitly allows commercial ﬁ  rms to ac-
quire and operate an ILC without being 
subject to the same supervision and over-
sight by the Federal Reserve as other 
bank holding companies. These ﬁ  rms 
can operate nearly identically to com-
mercial banks, with deposit-taking and 
lending powers, as well as direct access 
to the federal safety net. 
The recent proliferation of ILCs raises 
important public policy issues. It is often 
argued that the U.S. has maintained the 
separation of banking and commerce out 
of concern that the mixing of such activ-
ities could have adverse effects, resulting 
from a rise in anticompetitive practices, 
a misallocation of credit, a reduction in 
credit availability in local communities, 
a loss in consumer privacy, or an over-
burdening of the federal banking reg-
ulators’ supervisory resources. On the 
other hand, advocates of the banking 
and commerce mix argue that it would 
allow for greater risk diversiﬁ  cation, help 
reduce information costs, and solve cer-
tain asymmetric information and control 
problems associated with commercial 
lending. This could present opportunities 
for synergies in cross-selling, provide 
consumers with “one-stop-shopping,” 
and help U.S. banks remain internation-
ally competitive, since such afﬁ  liations 
are common in other industrialized 
economies. This Chicago Fed Letter sum-
marizes the discussion from this year’s 
Bank Structure Conference on whether 
banking and commerce should mix and 
what the implications would be for policy-
makers, bankers, and consumers.1 
Should banking and commerce mix?
Charles Calomiris, Columbia University, 
started the discussion, citing various 
risks associated with mixing commerce 
and banking, including the risk that a 
bank might lend preferentially to its 
afﬁ  liate or parent or that it might not The 44th annual Bank Structure Conference will be held 
May 14–16, 2008, at the InterContinental Hotel in Chicago, IL.
lend to competitors of its commercial 
afﬁ  liate. A bank might also inappropri-
ately marshal resources in support of a 
failing commercial parent or afﬁ  liate, 
which could jeopardize the bank’s safety, 
potentially imposing costs on the deposit 
insurance fund. However, Calomiris ar-
gued that, while these may be legitimate 
concerns for countries where competition 
and prudential regulation are weak, they 
merit little concern in the U.S. “We have 
a highly competitive and very effective 
system, both in terms of bank competi-
tion and regulatory oversight,” he ex-
plained, “and we already have very ample 
mechanisms from a regulatory stand-
point, and from a private market com-
petition standpoint, to deal with these 
potential risks.” 
Rather, Calomiris said the combination 
of banking and commerce would be bene-
ﬁ  cial as it would enhance technological 
innovation. “We have to take seriously 
the possibility that important innovations 
that might beneﬁ  t consumers … might 
come from outside the banking system, 
as they have in the past,” he remarked. 
Further, he said that new entrants “have 
incentives to come in very aggressively 
because of the potential to skim the 
cream. That is, to get the proﬁ  table 
customers right away.” 
Calomiris contended that the mixing of 
commerce and banking would be very 
proﬁ  table because banking is a network 
business. “The microeconomics of this is 
the microeconomics of networks, not the 
microeconomics of scale per se, or of 
scope, in some technological sense,” he 
argued. “That’s what is going to be driv-
ing … the mixing of commerce and bank-
ing. It’s going to be on the consumer 
side. Very small entrants with good, big 
ideas on the technology side.” 
Camden Fine, Independent Community 
Bankers of America, took a very different 
perspective. If banking and commerce are 
allowed to mix, Fine argued, “Over time, 
the individual, the small business owner, 
small towns, and rural countryside will 
suffer economically. More power will de-
volve to fewer and fewer hands, and eco-
nomic diversity will wither, and with it, 
choices. While population centers may 
ﬂ  ourish, the decline of rural and small 
town America will accelerate. … The less 
advantaged of our society will become 
even more disadvantaged.” In Fine’s 
opinion, banks play a unique role in ﬁ  nan-
cial systems, and they should not be com-
bined and integrated into commercial 
and mercantile businesses. Relaxing the 
current restrictions would result in large, 
monopolistic conglomerates, with adverse 
effects for the consumer and society. 
Cantwell Muckenfuss, Gibson, Dunn, and 
Crutcher LLP, questioned the potential 
for large conglomerate enterprises with 
substantial economic power to result 
from the mixing of banking and com-
merce. In his view, the concentration of 
market power argument is misplaced, 
given the structure and dynamics of the 
economy and antitrust laws. Muckenfuss 
argued that, instead of harming rural 
markets and underserved markets, the 
competition provided by the entry of 
major nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms into banking 
and ﬁ  nancial services would be beneﬁ  cial 
for consumers, particularly those under-
served by existing banking organizations. 
Muckenfuss also dismissed other con-
cerns related to the mixing of banking 
and commerce, such as the implications 
for the expansion of the federal safety 
net, potential problems with conﬂ  icts of 
interest, and unfair competition. Like 
Calomiris, Muckenfuss argued that these 
were not signiﬁ  cant problems. The super-
visory process; the existing rules govern-
ing afﬁ  liate transactions; the application 
process for new entrants; and the use of 
conditions to ensure the integrity, inde-
pendence, and separateness of the bank 
within its corporate family, he asserted, 
amply address such concerns and insu-
late the bank. He was more concerned 
with the potential for piecemeal legislation 
by Congress that will leave a bifurcated 
structure of regulation and supervision, 
with some existing ILCs being “grand-
fathered” and new ones being outlawed.
Mark Tenhundfeld, American Bankers 
Association, agreed with Fine’s position 
that banks are special. A unique feature 
of banks is their pivotal role in credit mar-
kets and their obligation to serve as neu-
tral arbiters of credit. His argument was 
fundamentally straightforward: Conﬁ  -
dence in the banking system is of para-
mount importance. “If we don’t have 
conﬁ  dence in our banks,” Tenhundfeld 
said, “we have a very big problem. And 
that, in a nutshell, is why we separate 
banking from commerce.” 
According to Tenhundfeld, there are two 
ways ILC afﬁ  liations, and the mixing of 
banking and commerce more generally, 
could undermine conﬁ  dence in the 
banking system. First, the mixing could 
undermine the independence and neu-
trality of banks as rational, independent 
arbiters in the allocation of credit. The 
bank’s credit decision could be based on 
factors other than the creditworthiness 
of the borrower. “When conﬂ  icts of in-
terest are at play,” stated Tenhundfeld, 
“the question of what’s rational takes on 
a different complexion. The decision 
no longer is conﬁ  ned to whether it will 
beneﬁ  t the bank. Indeed, it may become 
perfectly rational for a bank to act in a 
way that beneﬁ  ts the overall corporate 
entity, but is not in the bank’s best inter-
est.” He argued that when a bank extends 
credit to an afﬁ  liate, customers of an 
afﬁ  liate, or suppliers of an afﬁ  liate, the 
credit judgment will be inﬂ  uenced by 
the afﬁ  liated relationship, and not the 
standard credit elements. 
A second way that conﬁ  dence in the bank-
ing system could be undermined would 
be by allowing a commercial entity to 
beneﬁ  t from the bank’s preferred status 
because of its access to the federal safety 
net. For example, a commercial entity 
could transfer low-quality or high-risk 
assets to the bank or sell them to the bank 
at inﬂ  ated prices. Alternatively, the bank 
may provide guarantees to the parent’s 
creditors, thereby conferring on the 
parent the beneﬁ  ts of the bank’s status 
as an insured depository institution. 
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limited liability of banks could create risks 
for a bank in situations where the expo-
sure of a nonbank afﬁ  liate exceeds the 
capital or net worth of the bank. In such 
a situation, the parent may conclude that 
it is in the consolidated entity’s best in-
terest to transfer the loss to the bank.” 
Finally, Thomas Huertas, Financial
Services Authority in the UK, described 
what he thought made banks unique and 
how the U.S. regulation concerning 
acceptable banking activities, ownership, 
and afﬁ  liation with commercial ﬁ  rms 
differs from that in the UK and the 
European Union (EU). In the EU, 
commercial ﬁ  rms, including many ﬁ  rms 
headquartered in the U.S., own banks. 
Increasingly, Huertas argued, technology 
and market developments are blurring the 
distinction between banks and nonbanks. 
For example, the EU deﬁ  nes a bank as an 
institution that grants credit for its own 
account, receives deposits from the public, 
and has a banking license. However, 
commercial enterprises extend credit for 
their own account via trade credit and 
delayed payment terms, private place-
ments, and commercial paper. They can 
issue liabilities that are very similar to de-
posits, although not technically classiﬁ  ed 
as deposits. They are also able to develop 
bank-like arrangements. For example, 
PayPal has over 100 million customers 
that are able to send and receive pay-
ments, hold balances, and even withdraw 
cash from ATMs. Thus, commercial 
ﬁ  rms can and do engage in banking-
like activities. 
Huertas addressed the following ques-
tion to the conference: “If conﬂ  icts of 
interest can be managed, if connected 
lending can be regulated, and if com-
mercial enterprises can be considered 
ﬁ  t and proper owners of banks—as EU 
legislation and experience suggest—
should the U.S. consider removing the 
barriers to allowing afﬁ  liation between 
banks and commercial ﬁ  rms?” 
Evaluating the potential impact of 
mixing banking and commerce
In addition to the theme panel discussion, 
empirical work on the potential impact 
of mixing banking and commerce on risk 
diversiﬁ  cation, market structure, and bank 
service prices was also presented.2 
Hsin-Yu Liang and Alan Reichert, both 
of Cleveland State University, and Larry 
Wall, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
analyzed the potential diversiﬁ  cation ben-
eﬁ  ts of combining banking services with 
the provision of other ﬁ  nancial and non-
ﬁ  nancial activities. Financial theory says 
that combining assets in an efﬁ  cient port-
folio allows an investor to obtain the same 
return at lower risk, or higher returns for 
the same risk, relative to that obtained 
with any individual asset. The researchers 
set out to see how substantial the potential 
gains are and which industries combined 
with banking provide the best risk–return 
trade-offs. 
Using corporate income tax returns from 
the Internal Revenue Service for 1994–
2002, Liang, Reichert, and Wall calculated 
the return on equity and return on assets 
for each of ten major industry categories, 
as well as the standard deviation and co-
efﬁ  cient of variation of those returns as 
alternative industry risk measures. They 
then calculated the correlation of returns 
across the ten industry categories to eval-
uate the impact of combining banking 
with other sectors.  
The results suggest that increasing returns 
could have been accomplished with min-
imum risk by combining banks with either 
one of the construction, retail, or whole-
sale sectors. Expanding the analysis to 
allow for broader diversiﬁ  cation across 
all industry groups indicated that the 
potential for higher returns at the same 
level of risk was even greater. As risk and 
return increased, the efﬁ  cient portfolio 
had banking combined with an increasing 
share of these same three industry sectors. 
Thus, they argued, the potential bene-
ﬁ  ts from banking diversiﬁ  cation appear 
to be quite signiﬁ  cant. 
As noted earlier, Wal-Mart’s application 
to establish an ILC has raised signiﬁ  cant 
concerns about its potential effect on bank-
ing competition. Since bank branches 
in retail stores have proliferated recently, 
and since Wal-Mart is the largest retailer 
in the U.S. with a substantial market pres-
ence in many markets, the potential ef-
fect of a Wal-Mart-owned depository 
institution on market structure and com-
petition could be signiﬁ  cant. To gain 
some insight into the potential effect of 
a Wal-Mart-owned depository institution, 
Robert Adams, Robert Avery, and Ron 
Borzekowski, all of the Federal Reserve 
Board, analyzed the impact of branches 
of depository institutions that already 
operate inside Wal-Mart stores. While the 
analysis does not reveal how an actual 
Wal-Mart bank would function, it does 
reveal how important branch locations 
within Wal-Mart stores are to banks that 
operate them. 
Using FDIC Summary of Deposits data 
and private information on branches 
located in Wal-Mart stores, the researchers 
found that in 1994 there were only seven 
bank branches located in Wal-Mart stores. 
By 2006, the number had grown to over 
1,100 branches operated by some 300 
distinct institutions. To see if the deposit-
generating power of these bank ofﬁ  ces 
differed from that of other new bank 
ofﬁ  ces, the researchers examined changes 
in local market deposit shares follow-
ing the introduction of bank ofﬁ  ces in 
Wal-Mart facilities compared with the 
changes resulting when the same banks 
opened other branches (non-Wal-Mart 
ofﬁ  ces) over the period 1994–2006.
The study separately analyzed the impact 
in rural markets and metropolitan statis-
tical areas (MSAs). The results for ﬁ  rst-
time market entrants (versus banks expanding within a market) show that 
an institution opening a new branch in 
a rural market has, on average, about 6% 
market share within a year, which grows 
to approximately 9% in ﬁ  ve years. Enter-
ing the market by introducing a branch 
in a Wal-Mart store results in a share 
“premium” of approximately 2% for each 
of the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years of operation. The 
premium is not found in MSAs, where, 
in fact, the share gains from Wal-Mart 
branches are lower than in other mar-
kets. However, when market expansion 
occurs through the introduction of a 
Wal-Mart branch (instead of ﬁ  rst-time 
entry), a similar premium is found across 
both urban and rural markets. The re-
searchers argued that it is the comple-
mentarity of Wal-Mart branches with 
an existing distribution channel that 
makes the in-store locations valuable. 
Finally, Li Hao, Debarshi Nandy, and 
Gordon Roberts, all of York University, 
presented the results from their cross-
country study that assessed the extent to 
which a country’s bank regulation and 
supervisory practices affect the pricing of 
loans to borrowers in that country. Specif-
ically, controlling for countries’ legal and 
institutional characteristics, the research-
ers looked at how the integration of bank-
ing and commerce and the concentration 
of the banking sector impact loan pricing. 
Integration could lead to better loan terms 
because of stronger lender–borrower 
relationships and informational advan-
tages that could lead to more efﬁ  cient 
monitoring. The potential impact of mar-
ket concentration is unclear. A more 
concentrated industry could result in 
higher loan prices if greater concentra-
tion is associated with the exploitation 
of market power—the “market power” 
hypothesis. Alternatively, market concen-
tration may have resulted from the more-
efﬁ  cient ﬁ  rms growing to optimal size, and 
the resulting cost savings could be passed 
on in the form of lower loan prices—
the “efﬁ  cient structure” hypothesis. 
Analyzing over 54,000 loan facilities in 
49 countries for the 1989–2004 period, 
Hao, Nandy, and Roberts found that do-
mestic lenders charge lower loan spreads 
as the degree of integration of banking 
and commerce increases. In those coun-
tries with a higher level of integration, 
however, foreign lenders charge higher 
spreads. They argued that this results 
from the foreign banks’ inferior lending 
relationships and a resulting need to ex-
ercise greater loan monitoring relative 
to the domestic lenders. 
The beneﬁ  t of lower loan costs received 
from domestic lenders due to banking 
and commerce integration vanishes in 
countries with high banking concentra-
tion. In these countries, foreign lenders 
charge lower loan spreads and provide 
more favorable contract terms. This aligns 
1  The conference addressed a number of 
additional issues, including Basel II capital 
regulation, payday lending activity, the chang-
ing real estate markets, risk management, 
ﬁ  nancial stability, banking industry structure, 
and government-sponsored enterprises. 
2  Papers are available in Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, 2007, Proceedings of the 
43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure 
and Competition: The Mixing of Banking 
and Commerce, forthcoming.
with the “efﬁ  cient structure” argument: 
The more-efﬁ  cient foreign banks grow 
more rapidly, and they are able to pass on 
the efﬁ  ciency gains in lower loan spreads. 
Conclusion
The future of ILCs and the potential 
for allowing the mixing of banking and 
commerce in the U.S. remain unclear. 
Congress plans to address the issue, but 
legislation has yet to be fully developed. 
The FDIC has extended the moratorium 
on nonﬁ  nancial ILCs, and some FDIC 
board members have suggested that unless 
Congress addresses the issue by the end 
of the moratorium, it would be difﬁ  cult 
for regulators to justify denying future ILC 
applications. The development of sound 
public policy should be based on sound 
economic reasoning. The goal of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd 
annual Conference on Bank Structure 
and Competition was to help develop 
and debate that economic reasoning. 